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In May 2015, the Information Office of the State Council published a newwhite paper on China’s military strategy stating that “overseas interests[had become] an imminent issue.” The paper underlined that: 
With the growth of China’s national interests (Zhongguo de guojia
liyi 中国的国家利益), its national security is more vulnerable to in-
ternational and regional turmoil, terrorism, piracy, serious natural dis-
asters, and epidemics, and the security of overseas interests
concerning energy and resources, strategic sea lines of communica-
tion [SLOCs], as well as institutions, personnel, and assets abroad,
has become an imminent issue. (1)
The paper further indicated that “(…) in response to the new demands
resulting from the country’s growing strategic interests, the armed forces
will actively participate in both regional and international security cooper-
ation and effectively secure China’s overseas interests.” Accordingly, and de-
parting from its ideological policy of not having military bases abroad, China
in December 2015 signed a comprehensive agreement with Djibouti to
build a logistics facility for its anti-piracy task force in Obock. (2) In Novem-
ber, Chinese media quoted by South African news reports suggested that
China might also build a base in Namibia to protect its interests on Africa’s
western coast. (3)
Since 2013, China has promoted a “21st Century Maritime Silk Road” (21
shiji haishang sichou zhilu 21 世纪海上丝绸之路) that encourages invest-
ment in port infrastructure along its maritime route to Europe, suggesting
to some American, Indian, and Japanese analysts the materialisation of a
“string of pearls” (zhenzhu lian 珍珠链) that would allow China to construct
a network of naval facilities around the Indian Ocean under the cover of
commercial ventures. 
Few countries can claim to be global sea powers with navies deployed
and interacting around the globe. They include the United States, Britain,
Russia, and France. Is China adopting a “blue water strategy” (lanshui zhan-
lüe蓝水战略) to become a global sea power? And for what purpose?
Precedent and binding statements
With China’s permanent deployment of three vessels in the Gulf of Aden
since December 2008 and its hyperactive naval diplomacy, the People’s Lib-
eration Army Navy’s (PLAN) current out-of-area deployments probably ap-
proach 2,000 ship-days for out-of-area operations. At first glance, the
current situation of the PLAN appears similar to that of the Soviet Navy in
1964, when Moscow started to deploy its forces worldwide after practicing
active naval diplomacy in the aftermath of Stalin’s death to reassure the
West. Both countries vowed never to seek foreign bases, seen as contrary
to anti-imperialistic ideology. Both navies were born as coastal defence
forces, progressively expanding their areas of operation thanks to large aux-
iliary vessels that initially made up for the lack of foreign bases. Soviet out-
of-area operations grew to about 4,000 ship-days in 1964 following
Moscow’s display of naval impotence during the Cuban missile crisis. But
solving their lack of overseas bases required shifting to a policy that con-
tradicted the political declaration that the USSR did not seek military ports
in foreign countries because it did not threaten anyone. This premise was
conveniently set aside when the Soviet Navy gained access to foreign ports
in Syria, Guinea, Algeria, Libya, and later Vietnam. But as the former com-
mander-in-chief of the Northern Fleet, Admiral Ivan Kapitanets, explained
in his book on naval strategy, the Soviet Navy never had the ports it needed: 
The most difficult task for the Soviet Navy was to create a system
of bases. The USSR had no bases overseas. Floating workshops and
auxiliary ships could not resolve this problem. Through diplomatic
channels, the USSR got permission to enter the ports of Syria, Egypt
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(1967), Algeria (1969, renewed in 1978), and Cuba (1970). In 1971,
at the request of the Guinean government, the USSR was granted
access to the port of Conakry. In 1972, Soviet ships began to enter
the ports of Somalia, and in 1977 those of Benin. In 1978, they were
granted access to the ports of São Tomé and Príncipe. In 1979, Viet-
nam granted permission to use the naval base of Cam Ranh (…). (4)
Albeit limited, those naval facilities helped the Soviet Union increase its
overseas deployments. By 1976, Soviet out-of-area operations had risen to
48,000 ship-days: can we expect China to follow the same path?
In its April 2013 white paper on the “Diversified Employment of China’s
Armed Forces,” China committed itself very strongly “never [to] seek hege-
mony or behave in a hegemonic manner, nor [to] engage in military expan-
sion,” opposing “any form of “hegemonism” or power politics” and vowing
not to “interfere in the internal affairs of other countries.” (5) In May 2015,
the follow-up white paper explicitly restated those principles: 
China will unswervingly follow the path of peaceful development, pur-
sue an independent foreign policy of peace and a national defence
policy that is defensive in nature, oppose “hegemonism” and power
politics in all forms, and will never seek hegemony or expansion.
China’s armed forces will remain a staunch force in maintaining world
peace. (6)
Denouncing the United States, Britain, and France without naming them,
Navy Captain Zhang Junshe of the Marine Research Centre, a think tank
working with the naval staff, stressed that “China had not been part of any
war or armed conflict since the mid-1980s, as opposed to some countries
that wage wars worldwide under the pretext of humanitarianism and
democracy.” (7) Directly stigmatising Washington’s Iraq War and its geopo-
litical effects, Zhang denounced the “China threat theory” as “groundless,”
“for we know which country is actually disturbing the world order and un-
settling certain regions.” (8)
At the same time, China admits to building up its forces. The May 2015
military strategy states: 
Building a strong national defense and powerful armed forces is a
strategic task of China’s modernization drive and a security guarantee
for China’s peaceful development. (…) It is a Chinese Dream of
achieving the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. The Chinese
Dream is to make the country strong. China’s armed forces take their
dream of making the military strong as part of the Chinese Dream.
Without a strong military, a country can be neither safe nor strong. (9)
In the same document China also admits “to building itself into a maritime
power”: 
The seas and oceans bear on the enduring peace, lasting stability and
sustainable development of China. The traditional mentality that land
outweighs sea must be abandoned, and great importance has to be
attached to managing the seas and oceans and protecting maritime
rights and interests. It is necessary for China to develop a modern
maritime military force structure commensurate with its national
security and development interests, safeguard its national sover-
eignty and maritime rights and interests, protect the security of
strategic SLOCs and overseas interests, and participate in interna-
tional maritime cooperation, so as to provide strategic support for
building itself into a maritime power. (10)
Assessing the build-up
Western and Taiwanese experts have had a tendency to underestimate
Chinese military and naval developments. The most prominent watchers
and think tanks failed inexplicably and stubbornly to admit the very visible
fact that the Dalian shipyard was completing the former Soviet aircraft
carrier Varyag, (11) commissioned into the PLAN in September 2012. It did
not fit the views that China was putting the emphasis on its submarine
forces. Few foresaw the spectacular quantitative and qualitative progress
in Chinese platforms and weapon systems during the last decade, (12) in-
cluding the realisation of a stealth fighter (J-20) – still dismissed by some
on the day of its maiden flight. (13) However, through the careful study of
Chinese open sources, American experts revealed the operational deploy-
ment of a revolutionary weapon, the DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile
(ASBM). (14) The space event tracking ship Yuanwang-4, received attention
from Chinese netizens for its alleged involvement in an anti-ship ballistic
missile test in 2011. Following a collision and a fire, the ship was moved
to the Chengxi Shipyard in early 2010. Photographed in Lushun in 2011
with deflectors directed towards the skies, the ship is said to have been
hit later that year by a DF-21D before being sold for scrap. (15)
Those achievements were completed before the peering eyes of Chinese
netizens and publicised on the Internet prior to any official announce-
ments, nourishing accusations by Japan and the United States of a lack
of transparency. This criticism is certainly valid for the procurement of the
former Varyag and other hidden programs, following a traditional culture
of secrecy. But it is contradicted by the availability of Chinese Internet
sources that revealed the Varyag’s transformation and of more than 50
Chinese military journals, including 10 on naval affairs and technology.
China has begun publishing a new magazine for foreign attachés – China
Armed Forces – that matches its Western equivalents, and it has updated
its official military websites and improved its biannual white papers on
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defence. Using openly available Chinese data, the Swedish Stockholm In-
ternational Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) has been able to produce its
own revised estimate of China’s military budget. Furthermore, it is hard
to criticise China’s opacity when at the same time, the United States has
been hiding the development of secret weapons behind “black budgets.”
More recently, China has restrained its Internet enthusiasts, and less mil-
itary information may be available. Ideally, China should take Japan’s De-
fense Yearbook as a model for the detailed information it provides on the
Japan Self Defense Forces’ future procurements. (16)
In effect, China has embarked on an unprecedented naval shipbuilding effort
since the completion of its first classes of destroyers, frigates, and submarines
during the 1960-70s. Back in 2002, the US Department of Defense stated:
If China were to shift to a broader “sea control” strategy, the primary
indicators would include: development of an aircraft carrier, devel-
opment of robust anti-submarine warfare capabilities, development
of a true area anti-air warfare capability, acquisition of large numbers
of nuclear attack submarines, development of effective maritime
C4ISR, and increased open water training (...). (17)
Fourteen years later, China appears to be following the very path that the
US DoD sketched as an indicator of a shift towards a “broader sea control
strategy.” Chinese commentators are now admitting that aircraft carriers
and nuclear submarines are the two pillars of the Navy “like the two wheels
of a car or the two wings of a bird” (che zhi shuang lun, niao zhi shuangyi
车之双轮, 鸟之双翼). (18)
During those 14 years, China has completed its first aircraft carrier, com-
missioned in September 2012, and has built its second generation nuclear
submarines, although economic and technical constraints have restricted
the production of nuclear submarines to one unit every two years. Since
2002, the PLAN has only procured four nuclear strategic submarines
(SSBN) Type 09-IV Jin, (19) two nuclear attack submarines (SSN) Type 09-
III Shang, (20) with four cruise missile variants (SSGN) Type 09-IIIG nearing
completion to supplement the three original Type 09-I Han (SSN) and the
lone Type 09-II Xia (SSBN) still in service. (21) The first strategic patrol is yet
to be reported, and the small number of attack submarines is inadequate
for conducting long-range operations against the United States’ sea lines
of communication. Alongside 70 or so conventional submarines, including
14 Air Independent Propulsion (Type 039A), (22) China’s nuclear submarines
can delay carrier groups steaming to the rescue of Taiwan. Furthermore,
China has completed 45 major surface combatants: 22 destroyers – in-
cluding 20 fitted with long-range air defence missiles and 18 equipped
with two variants of a Chinese designed phased array radar “Sea Star” as
well as the HQ-9 air defence missile (Type 052C/D) – and 23 missile
frigates (Type 054/054A), including 21 fitted with the medium-range HQ-
16 air defence missile. Most of those platforms are apparently equipped
with towed arrays that give them a previously non-existent anti-submarine
warfare capability. China’s four trial ships have played a significant role in
the development of shipborne weapons. The two 6000-ton Dahua class
891 Bi Sheng (1997) and 892 Hua Luogeng (2008) trial platforms have re-
vealed future indigenous sensors and weapons. The 891 has tested both
versions of the “Sea Star” phased array radar for the 052C/D destroyers as
well as the HQ-9/HQ-16 air defence missiles and YJ-62 and YJ-18 anti-
ship missiles. The 892 currently mounts two new radars, two replicas of
the US-German air defence RAM missile system, and the cruise missile 
CJ-10, suggesting a land attack capability for the PLAN. Confirming its blue
water ambitions, the PLAN has also procured eight 20,000-ton (Type 903)
supply ships and is building the first of a class of 45,000-ton (Type 901)
combat support ship, more than quadrupling its replenishment capacities
for oceanic deployments. (23)
Ignoring the obsolescent missile destroyers and frigates still in service, (24)
the 45 PLAN post-2002 major surface combatants match the US Pacific
Fleet’s cruisers and destroyers and the Japanese surface fleet, but not the
combination of the two. It also outnumbers the Russian Pacific fleet (seven
major combatants) as well as the entire Russian surface fleet (29 major
combatants). The Russian Navy retains it superiority – albeit much eroded
for its nuclear submarine fleet (13 SSBN, 8 SSGN, 19 SSN). (25) Yet, the Chi-
nese Navy cannot compare with the Soviet Navy of 1990 with its four air-
craft carriers, two helicopter carriers, and 115 missile cruisers, destroyers,
and frigates supplemented by 175 gun cruisers, destroyers, and frigates, 63
nuclear strategic submarines, 52 nuclear cruise missile submarines, and 85
nuclear attack submarines. (26) Nonetheless, Western, Japanese, and Indian
experts are now soberly concerned with the Chinese Navy’s build-up. (27)
Despite its impressive modernisation, the PLAN remains significantly weaker
than the combination of the US Pacific Fleet, Taiwanese, Japanese, and Aus-
tralian navies that would be involved in a Taiwan crisis scenario. The PLAN
is therefore likely to pursue its build-up with, in particular, new classes of
cruise missile nuclear attack submarines (Type 093G and 095) and future
cruisers (Type 055) to escort its future carrier battle groups. Those devel-
opments will in turn reinforce the perception of China’s assertiveness and
further fuel an ongoing regional arms race.
Explaining the build-up
China’s current naval developments result from the implementation of
General/Admiral Liu Huaqing’s 1985 strategic vision for an “offshore de-
fense” within the “first island chain” (yidaolian yinei 一岛链以内) at first,
and then to the second island chain. Linking the Kuril Islands, the Japanese
Archipelago, Ryukyu Islands, Taiwan, the northern Philippines, and Borneo,
the first island chain harbours US bases that restrict China’s access to the
Pacific. In his memoirs, Liu Huaqing wrote: 
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Chairman Deng reminded us that the navy had no conception of its
strategic role and we had to give it a strategic direction (…). The op-
erational area for the navy would extend to the first island chain.
When our naval forces become stronger, we will cross into the north-
ern Pacific and move towards the “second island chain” formed by
the US-controlled Marianas. (28)
Cao Weidong, a researcher with the Chinese Navy’s Academic Research
Institute, explains how the 1985 change of strategy from “coastal defense”
(jin’an fangyu近岸防御) to “offshore defense” (jinhai fangyu近海防御) co-
incided with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and with
the Falklands War. The latter demonstrated that a coastal defence strategy
cannot defeat a force projection navy: 
The Argentines lost the Falklands on their doorstep while the British
recaptured the Falklands, thousands of nautical miles from home.
The lesson for the [Chinese] state was that coastal defense cannot
allow you to compete for command of the sea; you have to fight for
air supremacy; you must be able to fight far away from home; you
need to integrate offshore operations. With those lessons, the Chi-
nese Navy departed from its old coastal defense strategy (…). (29)
Up to the commissioning of the first air defence destroyers armed with
long-range missiles in the last decade, Chinese naval vessels could not defend
themselves beyond the 200 nautical miles covered by land-based naval avi-
ation. Since then, new Chinese platforms have given the PLAN the ability to
operate within the 500-1,000 nautical miles’ radius beyond the first island
chain. Following Liu Huaqing’s steps, a majority of Chinese commentators
focus on the Western Pacific in the context of a so-called “anti-access, area
denial” (A2/AD), in American terminology, against a possible US intervention
in support of Taiwan or Japan. The attempt to procure carrier-borne air power
came as early as 1946, when Chiang Kai-shek’s China made an unsuccessful
attempt to acquire escort carriers in the United States to accompany its
Japanese spoils and its former British cruiser. Three decades later, Beijing’s
strategic partnership with the West brought discussions with the United King-
dom over the purchase of Harrier VSTOL aircraft that could be used from a
small carrier. This never happened. But the present carrier development seems
to have originated with Liu Huaquing’s visit on board the American aircraft
carrier USS Kitty Hawk in May 1980: Liu was “deeply impressed by its impos-
ing magnificence and modern fighting capacity” and immediately advocated
the development of aircraft carriers to the PLA General Staff. According to
Liu, justification for aircraft carriers found a rationale in the Taiwanese puzzle.
Liu Huaqing’s initial intention was to use an aircraft carrier against Taiwan
and to protect ships operating outside the radius of land-based naval aviation: 
(…) when we were focusing on the Taiwan Strait issue [1994] we re-
alized that using land-based aviation was a waste because we would
increasingly need more planes and more air bases. And if we devel-
oped an aircraft carrier, we would not need to increase the total
number of planes. We would just need to modify them (…). The air-
craft carrier would become a force multiplier, augmenting the fire
power of the whole force. (30)
Western analysts have tended to dispute this view, arguing that a Chi-
nese carrier would constitute too big a target. Explaining that the first
justification for the aircraft carrier was air defence in the Taiwan Strait or
in the South China Sea within the first island chain, Phoenix TV – a main-
stream TV channel closely related to the authorities – retraced the im-
portant steps taken by Liu Huaqing when he headed the Navy (1982-87)
and then the Central Military Commission (1987-98). In 1987, the Navy
selected a number of outstanding young pilots and trained them to be
surface ship commanders. Currently, 70% of those pilots have served as
missile frigate commanding officers and the remainder as executive offi-
cers. The aircraft carrier project was initiated under Liu Huaqing during
the 1980s with the purchase of the former Australian carrier Melbourne
and the design of a pre-study. (31) On 14 March 1993, North Sea Fleet Po-
litical Commissar Zhang Haiyun first revealed at a CPPCC (Chinese Peo-
ple’s Political Consultative Conference) meeting that the Navy was
working on a carrier design. (32) For a long time, Western analysts held the
view that the carrier program had been postponed or cancelled in favour
of the submarine program. While Jiang Zemin was said to have opposed
the carrier, it now appears that the latter was aimed at providing air de-
fence to the naval forces deployed across the first island chain beyond
the protection of land-based aviation. According to Phoenix TV, the 1995-
96 cross-strait crisis prompted the decision by the Central Committee to
accelerate the carrier program under the code name “Nine Five” (jiu wu
九五). (33)
China’s secrecy on its carrier program may have been justified by a desire
to avoid panicking its neighbours while waiting for Japan and South Korea
to commission their large helicopter carriers. (34) In January 2012, China Daily
commentated on the three trial runs of the former Varyag, China’s first air-
craft carrier, as “a milestone in the Chinese navy’s development.” At the
same time, the paper dismissed “the sharp reactions from some countries”
and their “intent on raising false alarms.” Putting the emphasis on home
defence and sovereignty disputes, the paper cited “a coastline of 18,000
kilometers, more than 6,500 islands, and about 3 million square kilometers
of maritime area” as a prime justification for China to develop “a strong and
modern navy to prevent any violation of its territory, sovereignty over the
islands and maritime interests in its waters.” (35)
Deprived of catapults like its Russian sister-ship Admiral Kuznetsov, China’s
first aircraft carrier cannot compare with American and even French aircraft
carriers because its aircraft use a ski jump and consume more fuel to take
off. As a consequence, they cannot carry a heavy payload of bombs for strike
missions but are powerful enough to mount air-to-surface missiles. Acting
as an air defence platform, an aircraft carrier in the South China Sea would
neutralise the territorial claims of China’s small neighbours on the Spratly
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islands and answer President Hu Jintao’s November 2003 call for strength-
ening the system to defend the country’s sea rights and interests. (36) Both
President Hu Jintao and Prime Minister Wen Jiabao attended the commis-
sioning ceremony for the Liaoning in September 2012, followed two months
later by the first successful carrier landing of a J-15 Black Shark, the Chinese
unlicensed variant of the Soviet Su-33 Flanker naval fighter. As of January
2016, the Chinese Navy appears to be doing as well as Russia in the early
1990s. As of January 2016, it operated ten confirmed J-15 fighter-bombers
on the Liaoning, about one third of the air group it could carry. Unlike Russia
in the early 1990s, Chinese pilots are already capable of making night land-
ings. China should be able to deploy the Liaoning in one or two years’ time,
as Russia did in the Mediterranean in 1996. (37)
With China’s new strategic submarines base in Hainan, safeguarding the
patrol areas of the SSBNs may correspond to a Soviet-inspired “naval bas-
tion strategy” (haijun lengbao zhanlüe 海军棱堡战略) where the carrier
would sanitise an area and create the conditions for a credible second strike
capability by warding off foreign submarines, ships, and aircraft. (38) Latest
estimates on China’s new JL-2 strategic missile give a range of 7,500 km,
which is sufficient to strike Alaska and Hawaii from defended sanctuaries
in China’s Bohai Sea. It is unlikely that Chinese SSBNs could escape unde-
tected to the Kuril Islands area, from which they could strike most of the
continental United States. (39)
How many carriers?
On 31 December 2015, China’s Defence Ministry confirmed the construc-
tion of China’s first home-built aircraft carrier, the Type 001A. Captain Zhang
Junshe explained that China is building its second aircraft carrier “completely
on its own” at the Dalian shipyard in northeastern Liaoning Province. The
acknowledgement came more than one year after the governor of Liaoning
Province, a former shipbuilding executive, gave a speech to the shipyard’s
workers about the new task they faced. Zhang praised the experience gained
during the Liaoning’s sea trials to help the designers in their work, confirm-
ing implicitly that the Type 001A will be a replica. (40) Asked how many car-
riers China would need, Zhang Junshe cited India’s three and responded that
“a country like China theoretically needs at least three aircraft carriers to
ensure that one is always in operation.” (41) He urged “China threat propo-
nents” to consider the country’s population, superficies, coastline, and mar-
itime territory. (42) Asked about the prerequisites for building an aircraft
carrier, Zhang Junshe explained that it demanded mature shipbuilding, aero-
nautical, electronic, communications, and logistics industries. Asked about
the time needed, he cited the American example of about three years for
building the ship, two years for installing weapons and equipment, and one
year to familiarise military personnel, adding that there was no schedule
for China, since it did not have the American experience. (43) Asked about
the role of the future carrier, he stressed that the Liaoning would remain a
training platform while the new carrier would be a fighting unit. (44) Asked
to evaluate China’s ranking in relation to the rest of the world’s navies,
Zhang Junshe responded that it was too early “to say when China will be-
come a global naval power.” (45)
Chinese commentators also addressed the third aircraft carrier (Type 002).
Zhang Junshe explained that China is not yet ready for a nuclear-powered
platform, given the safety issues and the need to refuel the reactor after 15
years. (46) Other commentators argue that the carrier program is a gradual
process and that China cannot aim immediately at duplicating an American
Ford class aircraft carrier despite several artist’s renderings that represent a
100,000-ton US-inspired aircraft carrier, departing completely from the So-
viet legacy of the Liaoning and Type 001A. (47) In the meantime, China may
build a Type 002, along the lines of Type 001A but with catapults instead
of a ski-jump. With three carriers by 2030, not counting the Liaoning, China
could contemplate forcing Taiwan into submission and delaying or deterring
the US Pacific fleet. 
Regarding the rumoured Type 081 “through deck helicopter carrier am-
phibious assault ship,” author Shi Bin acknowledges the advantages of an
amphibious assault ship and discusses whether China’s current Type 071
multi-functional dock landing ship could evolve gradually into an indigenous
amphibious assault ship: “An amphibious assault ship provided with com-
prehensive and oceanic combat capabilities would bring good benefits, es-
pecially for its large-scale aviation facilities [to perform] multi-role
anti-submarine and mine clearance [missions].” Shi Bin sees the advantage
of vertical landings for the PLA Marines but notes that the main obstacle
would be the aviation industry’s inability to provide an appropriately sized
helicopter. Shi Bin underlines that the “development of the Chinese Navy’s
amphibious ships must reflect the ideological perspective of an overall [Chi-
nese] defensive strategy, very different from the US global strategy.” Fur-
thermore, he stresses its costs: “The amphibious assault ship also has high
acquisition and maintenance costs (…) while China’s economic conditions
do not allow for large-scale equipment and for an amphibious assault ship
military strategy.” However, in the longer term, Shi Bin considers the pro-
curement of amphibious assault ships by China as “inevitable” (shi biran de
是必然的) both to solve the Taiwan issue and as a “necessary tool” to project
national power and improve China’s international influence at a lesser cost
than the deployment of an aircraft carrier. (48)
Is the carrier the ultimate weapon? An article published in Guofang cankao
(National Defense Reference) and posted on the website Zhongguo jun-
wang (49) stresses that the future of the aircraft carrier is uncertain: how long
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will the aircraft carrier be able to “dominate” the oceans? When will other
countries “change course” in “the development of other advanced warships
or new concept weapons”? The US Navy is developing “new concept”
weapons such as the 300 km electromagnetic railgun and the tactical laser.
However, the authors take note that the US Navy still trusts the aircraft
carrier to ensure “sea supremacy” (haishang bazhu海上霸主) until the end
of the century. The future Ford class should be more powerful than the
Nimitz: the number of daily sorties should increase from 140-160 to 180-
220. The carrier is also characterised by its global role, both for displays of
strength during crises and for “soft power,” as demonstrated by the United
States during the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami and the 2010 earthquake in
Haiti. (50)
New missions
For more than a decade, Chinese experts have been writing extensively
on the question of “sea power.” They tend to agree that protecting China’s
growing global interests requires both naval modernisation and economic
development, and that the country needs an ocean-going “blue-water” fleet
(lan shui 蓝水). Until about 2008, they did not view the protection of the
SLOCs as a main driver for China’s maritime strategy. (51) Chen argued that
the idea of protecting the SLOCs had no significant influence on China’s
national security strategy (zhipeixing zuoyong支配性作用). Chen and other
Chinese experts explained that “protecting maritime interests” (baohu
haiyang quanyi保护海洋权益) was becoming increasingly important while
the defence of Chinese sovereignty in neighbouring waters remained the
core mission. (52)
Many view the 21 antipiracy patrols conducted in the Gulf of Aden since
2008 as a turning point, with the beginning of a permanent Chinese naval
presence in the Indian Ocean alongside Mahanian principles to safeguard
the SLOCs. (53) Chinese analysts confirm this view. For Cao Weidong, China’s
naval strategy shifted from brown to blue waters, following the earlier West-
ern examples of Britain and the United States. As Cao observes, China is es-
pousing the theories of Mahan and Corbett maximising the interests of the
country through the sea. The “21st Century Maritime Silk Road” is an ini-
tiative unveiled by Chinese President Xi Jinping in October 2013 to connect
China with Asia, Africa, and Europe. It aims to promote trade cooperation
and cultural exchanges among the peoples, paralleling the land Silk Road
across Eurasia. Cao Weidong sees the 21 escort task forces deployed to the
Gulf of Aden since December 2008 as a major step towards the Navy’s new
role of safeguarding the “Maritime Silk Road,” stressing the importance of
cooperation with other navies to fulfil this mission. (54) The “Maritime Silk
Road” has been allocated almost $50 billion for “win-win” projects with
neighbouring countries. For Cao Weidong, China’s “deep sea power strategy
is imperative.” And it must overcome continental inertia and US-Japan con-
tainment. (55)
China’s 2010 White Book emphasised both the defensive and deterrent
role of the “offshore defense strategy” beyond the first island chain and re-
ferred to operations in distant waters: “In line with the requirements of off-
shore defense strategy, the PLA Navy (PLAN) endeavors to accelerate the
modernization of its integrated combat forces, enhances its capabilities in
strategic deterrence and counterattack, and develops its capabilities in con-
ducting operations in distant waters and in countering non-traditional se-
curity threats.” The paper refers to “new method of logistic supports for
sustaining long-time maritime missions” and “on drills in distant waters”
for “missions other than war.” (56) China’s 2015 White Paper slightly changes
the wording to incorporate “open seas protection”: 
In line with the strategic requirement of offshore waters defense and
open seas protection, the PLA Navy (PLAN) will gradually shift its
focus from “offshore waters defense” to the combination of “offshore
waters defense” with “open seas protection,” and build a combined,
multi-functional and efficient marine combat force structure. The
PLAN will enhance its capabilities for strategic deterrence and coun-
terattack, maritime maneuvers, joint operations at sea, comprehen-
sive defense and comprehensive support. (57)
Departing drastically from the original air defence justification beyond
the first island chain and in the South China Sea, writers now link the air-
craft carrier to “China’s foreign trade”: “China’s economy is increasingly
dependent on the ‘maritime lifeline’.” For the China Ocean Shipping Com-
pany (COSCO) routes and the “21st Century Maritime Silk Road’s protec-
tion” commentators argue for “a strong fighting force” (zhan li qiangda
战力强大) with “both offensive and defensive naval forces” (gongfang jian
ju di haishang liliang 攻防兼具的海上力量). Therefore, “China’s homeland
defense strategy must protect national interests in all areas and regions
from a defense strategy perspective.” The development of a “blue water”
(lan shui) navy is presented as a first step for China’s sea power strategy
to address the energy security problem and reduce a situation of vulner-
ability. (58) Reporting on the commissioning of the Liaoning in September
2012, China Daily referred to China’s interests on the high seas as “the
world’s largest exporter in 2009,” with “63 percent of its iron ore and 55
percent of its crude oil imported by sea in 2010” and linked the aircraft-
carrier to China’s economy as a guarantor of “the safety of China’s per-
sonnel, assets, and shipping lanes.” (59) The paper also linked the rebuilding
of the Varyag to China’s increasing global status and responsibilities under
the United Nations, citing peace-keeping missions, counter-piracy patrols,
and humanitarian assistance. For mainstream media circulating official or
near-official views such as China Daily or Feiyangwang, the creation of a
Chinese aircraft carrier battle group meant to protect China’s economic
lifeline from the South China Sea to the Strait of Malacca and the Indian
Ocean has become a priority. 
Would China deploy its aircraft carrier to influence events ashore? In Oc-
tober 2015, with the Liaoning still conducting sea trials with barely 10 fight-
ers available, the Lebanese and Israeli press speculated that the Chinese
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carrier was heading for Syria to participate in air strikes alongside the Russ-
ian air force. In an interview with the Chinese newspaper Huanqiu shibao
(Global Times), Captain Zhang Junshe rejected “false rumours” about the
Liaoning being “en route” to the Mediterranean. While not dismissing the
idea that China could deploy an aircraft carrier during an international crisis,
Zhang reiterated Beijing’s longstanding position that it should not interfere
in another country’s internal affairs: “China’s position is to respect the free
choice of the Syrian people and not to add to a military intervention in
Syria or a forcible power shift, which is why China could not send an aircraft
carrier to Syria to interfere in the internal affairs of the country.” (60)
Another method to influence events ashore is to provide relief to devel-
oping countries. Researchers from the Department of Political Science of
the Dalian Naval Academy (61) bring a new justification for China’s hospital
ship An Wei, commissioned in 2006 to support a military operation against
Taiwan. Liu Hui and Liu Jiefeng from the Wuhan Naval University of Engi-
neering stress the need to develop military soft power in Military Operations
Other Than War (MOOTW) to augment China’s influence in the world and
before the world’s opinion. The An Wei inaugurated this new kind of naval
diplomacy under the concept of the “harmonious ocean philosophy.” Code-
named “Mission-Harmony,” the hospital ship’s five deployments to the In-
dian Ocean, the Philippines, and Latin America are described as “an
ideological weapon for shaping a favourable environment for the PLAN.” (62)
Does the “21st Century Maritime Silk Road”
constitute a “string of pearls”? 
Since 2005, American, Japanese, and Indian researchers have anticipated
the construction of a network of Chinese naval bases that would enable
China to encircle India and project its naval forces into the Indian Ocean.
Those analysts have long argued that China is seeking to build a “string of
pearls” by investing in harbour installations in Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri
Lanka, and Myanmar. (63) Hideaki Kaneda, a retired Japanese admiral, ob-
served that the Chinese were constructing strategic relationships and sea
ports along the sea lines stretching from the South China Sea to the Persian
Gulf (Gwadar in Pakistan, Sittwe, Kyaukpu in Burma, Hambantota in Sri
Lanka). Under Mahanian logic, this “string of pearls” would permit larger-
scale military deployments in the future to protect Chinese commerce: “All
of Asia must wake up to the arrival of Chinese-style aggressive ‘Sea Power.’
Japan, in particular, must reformulate its national maritime strategy with
this in mind.” (64) Accordingly, since 2006, Japan’s Defense White Book sees
a fourth mission for the Chinese naval forces: “to defend Chinese sea lanes,
probably beyond Chinese home waters.” (65)
For a long time, China ruled out the possibility of acquiring naval bases
abroad, denying that Gwadar could become a naval base despite Pak-
istan’s desire that China should think otherwise. China has relentlessly
rejected this interpretation, explaining that its investments in foreign
ports is market driven. In September 2012, Captain Zhang Junshe explic-
itly dismissed the “string of pearls” theory, blaming Western scholars
“who see the development of China’s aircraft carrier and missiles as a
threat to other countries” and “allege that China is building a series of
military bases, or the so-called string of pearls, in the Indian Ocean under
the pretense of helping some countries build commercial port facili-
ties.” (66) Zhou Bo of the Chinese Academy of military science clearly re-
futed the “string of pearls” concept and denied the report that China is
planning to build military bases around the Indian Ocean. He wrote:
“China has only two objectives in the Indian Ocean: economic benefit
and the security of shipping lines.” (67)
With the mainstream concept that China’s blue water navy and its aircraft
carriers will protect the new “21st Century Maritime Silk Road” initiative,
Phoenix TV published an interesting analysis of the mutually supporting land
and maritime Silk Roads in relation to the Taliban resurgence in Afghanistan
and its threat to the Pakistani government and consequently to Gwadar as
the future main port of Western China. Gao Bai, director of the Center for
Strategic Studies of Chinese High-speed Rail of Southwest Jiaotong Univer-
sity, and professor at Duke University, addresses the strategic significance of
Pakistan for China’s sea power and its railway from Gwadar (on the Indian
Ocean) to Kashgar. (68) With its government losing control of the Islamic
groups that used to fight India in Kashmir, and with an energy deficit that
drives investment abroad, Pakistan is highly vulnerable, causing a security
threat on China’s borders and in Xinjiang Province. Furthermore, Afghanistan
might once again fall into Taliban hands. To overturn the situation, the re-
searchers believe that China must invest heavily in Pakistan and more specif-
ically in the construction of the Pakistani port of Gwadar and in the
China-Kashgar Railway. Accordingly, “if the China-Pakistan’s economy be-
comes highly integrated, the port of Gwadar could be turned into China’s
western port, comparable to Shanghai or Ningbo.” Gao Bai further explains
that “if you build a powerful navy base in Gwadar, China can give an effective
and timely response to any threat to China’s interests emerging from the
Middle East.” For Gao Bai, a military base in Gwadar would greatly increase
confidence and cooperation with China’s economic partners in the region –
Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Myanmar – and facilitate the emergence of a “string
of pearls,” the very concept that American, Japanese, and Indian researchers
fearfully anticipated two decades ago. He stresses that such a strategic move
would facilitate China’s control over Xinjiang separatists and secure its west-
ern borders while making China a genuine Indian Ocean country and safe-
guarding national sea power. By endorsing Pakistan’s security interests, China
would rein in terrorism, not only in Pakistan but also in Afghanistan. Regard-
ing India’s opposition to China’s naval ventures in the region, the authors
feel that China should first “establish its presence in the Indian Ocean, and
then look for cooperation on the basis of peaceful coexistence with India.”
With China acting as a stabiliser, Gao Bai sees a strategic interest for India
to seek better relations with Pakistan in order to use the Pakistani railway to
export its goods to Iran, Turkey, and Europe, as well as Central Asia. Instead
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of antagonising India, the authors believe that “this strategy will greatly
change the current situation of mutually suspicious Sino-Indian relations to
create the conditions for common Sino-Indian strategic interests. Ultimately,
the authors would hope to extend this land route and railway connection to
the Arabian Peninsula and the African continent. (69)
How to handle the United States?
Notwithstanding Captain Zhang Junshe’s reassuring remarks, a worrying
note still exists. It suggests that China’s build-up is destined to change the
military balance and facilitate the use of force in sovereignty disputes, stat-
ing that “the time to use force, recover the occupied territories, and safe-
guard maritime rights and interest is gradually approaching.” The same
source suggests that “China cannot shelve the dispute hanging over its joint
development principle by making enormous concessions.” (70) Japan and its
American ally are also seen as the most formidable opponents interfering
in China’s sovereignty issues over Taiwan and the South China Sea: (71)Japan-
ese Prime Minister Abe has an interest in maintaining a tense relationship
with China to push forward his “constitutional amendment” campaign, and
disregarding Chinese and Korean feelings, the Japanese Prime Minister’s vis-
its to the Yasukuni Shrine have exacerbated tensions since December 2013.
According to this view, the United States and Japan have also taken advan-
tage of the crisis: “[Their] efforts to counter China’s new maritime strategy
are clear,” and the land reclamation by China in the South China Sea is being
used by the United States as a pretext for its naval presence in the area,
while China’s new blue water strategy is being used by the Abe cabinet in
his efforts to “normalise” the military in Japan. (72) In sum, the new version
of “Japan-US defence cooperation guidelines” has ensured closer relations
between the two allies to contain China’s maritime developments over
“three seas interaction” (sanhai liandong三海联动) that would conveniently
unite the East and South China Sea dispute with the Taiwan issue. However,
a reassuring note concedes that all parties have shown an interest in es-
tablishing crisis management and control mechanisms to prevent the acci-
dental outbreak of war, and that the United States, Japan, and the
Philippines are seeking confrontation but not war. This policy is portrayed
as the “fight but avoid war” (yao douzheng dan ye yao bi zhan要斗争但也
要避战) principle. (73)
The Global Times and Xinhua editorialist Zhou Xiaoping claim that the
United States Navy’s is ten times superior to its closest foe, with Washington
controlling 80% of the global trade through its more than 200 military bases.
Zhou explains that the United States – following the British example – leads
the world, not for a “better system” but because sea power gives it control
of the world’s routes and markets. Zhou Xiaoping compares the United
States to the Ottoman Empire: two “bad systems with a strong military
power to dominate the trade routes.” He explains that US maritime domi-
nation puts pressure on China’s maritime routes, just as the Ottoman Empire
put pressure on China to dominate the Silk Road. The author believes that
Chinese “clean” fast trains will bring tremendous geopolitical and geo-eco-
nomical changes to Eurasia and the World, putting an end to Anglo-Saxon
domination. He calls the “China high-speed rail strategy a deadly challenge
to NATO-led naval power.” With its new high-speed rail network, Chinese
railways advocates hope that China’s new high-speed rail network will con-
nect Chengdu, Istanbul, and Hamburg in just 16 and 18 hours. Pushing the
argument to the extreme, some railways lobbyists argue that intercontinen-
tal land transportation will replace sea transportation and bring wealth and
political stability to Eurasia. (74) Accordingly, they believe that land rights is-
sues will matter more than maritime rights issues in the future. (75)
An anonymous author in the military section of the Sina website, which
can be regarded as mainstream, notes that “with the implementation of the
‘United States’ return to Asia-Pacific strategy’,” the People’s Navy faces “a
real and urgent anti-submarine warfare challenge.” He remarks that the
American “Virginia-class submarines commissioned recently are quieter and
well-armed with 1,600-2,500 km Tomahawk cruise missiles [that constitute
a major threat] to the economic, military, and industrial heart of the coastal
urban areas (including Beijing).” The editor explains that China has made
great progress “on the road to developing conventional submarines for off-
shore operations” with the types 039A and 039B Yuan class Air Independent
Propulsion (AIP) submarines. The author lists four key technologies for con-
ventional submarines that China must improve: Air Independent Propulsion,
towed array sonar technology, X shaped rudders, and “vibration damping
technology.” (76)
In July 2014, Modern Ships (xiandai jian chuan 现代舰船) a popular mag-
azine, translated an article by Walter McDougal on “American Grand Strat-
egy: From History to Present.” The editor explored scenarios for “power
sharing” between the US and China under various mechanisms such as a
“cooperative equilibrium” (hezuo xing pingheng合作性平衡), a “grand bar-
gain” (da maoyi大贸易), or a “big compromise” (da tuoxie 大妥协). Wash-
ington would have to give away its lead in exchange for cooperation with
China. The Modern Ships’ reviewer understood the confrontation between
the US and China as a manifestation of Huntington’s clash of civilisations
and as a consequence of American self-confidence (Meiguo shi zixin 美国
式自信) despite a declining economy. The commentator saw the United
States as an “arrogant leader” that “is not serious about the possibility of
sharing power.” (77)
The PLAN is more open in its relations with the United States. In November
2012, Navy secretary Ray Mabus was given a tour of a brand new Yuan-class
AIP submarine while a delegation of 29 US Navy Captains visited the Liaon-
ing in October 2015. As noted by Global Times, 2015 was the first year in
which the two sides exchanged delegations at such a high level to discuss
operations, communications, and the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea
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(CUES), an agreement reached at the 2014 Western Pacific Naval Sympo-
sium to reduce the chance of an incident at sea between the major regional
navies and the United States. The hawkish Global Times approved, stating
that “China and the US should establish regular exchanges regarding military
equipment, technology and strategies to shape a comprehensive and multi-
dimensional image of each other.” (78) Officially, the Chinese Navy sees “free-
dom of navigation operations” (FONOPS) by the US Navy near the disputed
islets and reefs in the South China Sea as “the latest attempt by Washington
to return tension to the South China Sea and encourage more regional stake-
holders to challenge China.” Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying
said that under the Chinese Law on the Territorial Sea enacted in 1992, for-
eign warships entering China’s territorial sea must obtain approval from the
Chinese government. Captain Zhang Junshe, the aforementioned naval an-
alyst, explained that one of the US goals is “to bring tension back to the re-
gion.” “In the long run, Washington still defines the South China Sea issue as
a tool to contain China,” Zhang Junshe added. (79)
However, a senior Chinese researcher noted that the United States had
waited for the month of November to conduct their first FONOPS while at
the same time the US and Chinese navies joined for an exercise in the At-
lantic and Admiral Wu Shengli communicated through a video conference
with US officials. He added that the main accomplishment of President Xi’s
visit to the United States was a commitment from both countries not to
engage in a new Cold War. (80) Another senior researcher was less positive,
mentioning the risk of incidents and the impact on common Chinese people
who resent when their government reacts too weakly to the US naval pres-
ence on China’s shores. (81)
Che Yue, a member of the Naval History Research Association, suggests
acting with caution so as not to provoke the United States: “If we continue
to develop overseas interests, including in Africa, if we continue to expand
trade cooperation with Europe, while we follow the right strategy, China is
likely to become a maritime country. But this strategy requires very careful
thinking. China’s rise will have inevitably led to confrontational relations
with the United States, the Pacific’s other major country.” In order to pre-
vent conflict, Che Yue suggests that “China’s Sea Power development
[should] follow the wartime American model” and not Germany’s model.
Before World War I, Berlin challenged Britain in the North Sea while the
United States abstained from provoking Britain. And after the end of World
War I, the United States Navy secured parity from the Royal Navy at the
1922 Washington Treaty after having promoted the concepts of “equality
and cooperation.” Even so, Che Yue notes that the United States might have
fought Britain under “War Plan Red” if London had threatened its sphere of
influence in the Caribbean. (82)
The emergence of a Chinese maritime power brings together a tacit al-
liance between India, Vietnam, Japan, and Australia, the latter two being al-
ready the closest American allies in the region. 
Conclusion
China has embarked on a build-up aimed at making China a “sea power”
mainly in the Indo-Pacific region to deter US intervention in Taiwan and
to protect its trade in the Indian Ocean. China has acquired a medium-
sized aircraft carrier about one tenth as capable as a US super-carrier and
is learning the ropes as fast as the more experienced and poorer Russia
did in the early 1990s. As a source of pride for its citizens, China’s aircraft
carrier program plays into the hands of the Communist Party to demon-
strate its legitimacy and success. Within two to three years, China will be
able to deploy its first carrier with a dozen or more fighters just as Russia
did in 1996. Like the former Soviet Union, China is building a second and
planning for a third and a fourth carrier, the last most likely larger and nu-
clear. And yet, China’s first two medium-sized aircraft carriers are much
less capable than the United States’ ten super carriers and ten amphibious
assault ships with vertical-short take-off and landing aircraft. If it limits
the number of its future aircraft carriers to three or four units, China will
remain a regional navy with global reach leading India, the UK, and France
at that level. 
China is securing its first military base abroad. So far, this development
cannot compare with the US and Western military presence across the
world, and Chinese commentators can rightly feel offended by the outcry.
A real changing factor would be the creation of a naval base in Pakistan. So
far, China appears to be more interested in the geo-economic effect of the
Gwadar-Kashgar corridor on its western provinces. And it is trying to win
India’s support for this project by opening markets to its longstanding ad-
versary. In that context, it is unlikely that China will seek to confront the
Indian Navy in the Indian Ocean as many anticipate, although it should in-
crease its surveillance of India’s strategic submarines in the Gulf of Bengal
by deploying more submarines to this area, most likely from Hainan and
not Gwadar.
In the past fifteen years, the PLAN has developed credible air defence and
anti-submarine capabilities on its modern ocean-going combatants for op-
erations beyond the Western Pacific first island chain. Although it certainly
lacks the anti-submarine experience of Western navies – partly lost in the
aftermath of the Cold War – the PLAN is no longer innocent in the field. At
the same time, China still lacks the “large number of nuclear attack sub-
marines” that would allow the country to gain sea control in distant areas
or to replicate the Soviet Union’s challenge to the United States carrier bat-
tle groups. Given economic, technical, and industrial constraints, China will
not field more than 12 newer nuclear attack submarines in 2025. By then,
its combat capabilities will remain at least ten times inferior to those of
the Soviet Navy at its best. In particular, China does not have supersonic
long-range bombers or anti-submarine long-range aircraft to conduct of-
fensive maritime operations at a very long distance. Can its long-range anti-
ship ballistic missiles play that role? Could it be a game-changer as some
Western analysts have claimed? So far it only appears to be a factor in a
Taiwan contingency. It might keep US aircraft carriers from crossing the first
island chain towards China, reducing the reach and effectiveness of their
strikes. Those missiles have a better probability of hitting a carrier sailing
through choke points where targets could be more easily detected and
where missiles could be programmed with fixed parameters. Will it affect
the United States’ implicit commitment to defending Taiwan’s freedom?
This remains to be seen. 
Through military modernisation, China has already achieved the political
objective of making Taiwan’s de jure independence impossible. If there is a
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“China threat,” it is mostly against the “province” of Taiwan, China’s new
navy being trained to deter or keep at bay a US intervention while con-
tributing to securing a rapid victory on the island. As long as China claims
to respect the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in South China
Sea, the PLAN’s modernisation only appears as an intimidating factor for
smaller nations such Vietnam and to a lesser extent Malaysia, which all have
sovereignty issues with China, although it could be argued that the toothless
Philippines, backed up by the United States and Japan, remains immune to
intimidation. In the East China Sea, China has resurrected a long-shelved
maritime dispute with its former partner against the Soviet Union to protest
Japan’s celebration of its war heroes with repeated official visits to the Ya-
sukuni Shrine. In that context, the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea
(CUES) adopted by the major navies in 2014 greatly reduces the risk of un-
wanted confrontation. 
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